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and information asymmetry among them leads to asymmetric loss functions, which 
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conservatism in China, debt is the most important, followed by ownership, and that 
board has little inﬂuence.
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1 However, if the two estimates are not equally likely, conservatism does not necessarily dictate using the more 
pessimistic one rather than the more likely one. Conservatism no longer requires deferring recognition of 
income beyond the time that adequate evidence of its existence becomes available or justiﬁes recognizing losses 
before there is adequate evidence that they have been incurred (Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
No. 2, FASB).
2 Conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005) or ex-post conservatism (Richardson and Tinaikar, 2004), 
also called news dependent conservatism (Chandra et al., 2004) and asymmetric income timeliness (Basu, 
1997), implies more timely earnings recognition of bad than good news. Unconditional conservatism (Beaver 
and Ryan, 2005) or ex-ante conservatism (Richardson and Tinaikar, 2004), also called news-independent 
conservatism (Chandra et al., 2004), stems from the application of generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) or policies that reduce earnings independent of current economic news.
3 Conservatism can protect the interests of creditors, providing creditors with new information to react to 
contract violations and enforce in a timely fashion their contractual rights, such as limiting the leverage, 
investment or dividend policy. 
4 Conservatism can be beneﬁcial for minority shareholders as it can reduce the amount of ineﬃcient capital 
investment, restricting the power of management.
5 Conservatism can reduce the level of information asymmetry between creditors and shareholders, lowering 
ﬁnancing costs.
6 Conservatism can reduce the level of pressure and criticism from the public due to the standards that regulatory 
authorities have set.
1.  Introduction
Conservatism is an important and basic principle in ﬁnancial accounting. It stipulates 
that possible errors in measurement should be in the direction of understatement rather 
than overstatement of net income and net assets. If two estimates of earnings or assets 
to be received or paid in the future are approximately equally likely, then conservatism 
dictates that the less optimistic one be used (Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 2, FASB).1 Under conservative accounting, the average market value is 
higher than the book value in the long run (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Zhang, 2000; 
Beaver and Ryan, 2000; Penman and Zhang, 2002). Such accounting recognizes bad 
news in a more timely way than it does good news, leading to asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Watts, 2003a). This type of conservatism is also known 
as conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).2 Conservatism is beneﬁcial for 
creditors,3 minority stockholders,4 the whole ﬁrm5 and regulatory authorities6 (Ahmed 
et al., 2002; Watts, 2003a; Francis et al., 2004; Nikolave, 2006; Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007; Zhang, 2008).
Watts (2003a) proposes that one factor influencing accounting conservatism is 
regulations. He argues that standard setting authorities may face political pressure and 
public criticism. To reduce their political costs and protect the interests of investors, 
these authorities prefer conservative accounting (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). 
However, Ball et al. (2003) contend that management incentives have a greater inﬂuence 
on financial reporting policies than have other factors. In China, managers face 
pressure from the government. This aﬀects their political future and is thus likely to be 
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7 In China, management may be promoted and transferred to government/big groups, appointed as oﬃcials or 
awarded political titles if their or their ﬁrm’s performance is excellent.
8 Reforms were implemented in 2005 and 2006 concerning the circulation of those shares in the Chinese 
securities market. Since those reforms, SOE shares can be traded at the market price in the open market under 
some conditions.
a greater inﬂuence than either compensation incentives or market forces, as is the case 
documented in the US literature.7 
The extant literature suggests that corporate governance may also significantly 
inﬂuence ﬁrm accounting and auditing decisions, aﬀecting the quality of accounting 
information. However, corporate governance in China is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that 
in developed markets such as the United States, United Kingdom, or other European 
countries. In China, the government controls nearly 80% of publicly listed ﬁrms, an 
arrangement dramatically diﬀerent from that of many other markets. The government, 
as the controlling shareholder, owns on average nearly two ﬁfths of the stock of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Before 2005, shares in these companies could not be freely 
traded at the market price on the open market.8 In contrast, management ownership 
is much lower in China, averaging only 0.03%. A compounding factor is that legal 
enforcement in China is very weak, which likely causes board monitoring and corporate 
governance mechanisms to be ineffective. These institutional characteristics raise the 
interesting questions of whether and how corporate governance inﬂuences accounting 
conservatism in China in particular, and in other emerging markets with similar 
institutions in general. 
This paper investigates the determinants of conservative accounting using the data of 
listed ﬁrms in China and accrual-based measures of conservatism. Our results provide 
support for the theory proposed by Lafond and Watts (2008), namely, that information 
asymmetry constitutes an important reason for accounting conservatism, and are 
consistent with the ﬁnding of Ball et al. (2003) that management incentives have greater 
inﬂuence on accounting conservatism than have other factors. We ﬁnd that a high level 
of debt, a low level of control rights of controlling shareholders, more layers of control 
in the corporate structure and a low level of management ownership are associated with 
a higher level of conservatism. We also find that accounting conservatism is greater 
among SOEs, which suggests that the concerns of managers about their promotion/
political careers and governmental pressures speciﬁc to SOEs likely play a role in shaping 
accounting practices. Our results reveal that, in China, debt is the most important factor 
aﬀecting accounting conservatism, followed by ownership, and that the board has little 
eﬀect. 
Our research differs from other research that has investigated accounting 
conservatism among Chinese ﬁrms (Chen, Gul and Wu, 2008; Chen, Chen, Lobo and 
Wang, 2008) in that we use accrual-based measures rather than measures based on the 
Basu model. The Basu model captures conditional conservatism and relies heavily on 
the eﬃcient market hypothesis, as it assumes that negative returns proxy for the bad 
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news of ﬁrms. In China, negative returns are often caused by government regulations 
and intervention, and do not necessarily reflect the real economic performance of 
firms. Our accrual-based measures capture total conservatism, including conditional 
and unconditional conservatism (which are both pertinent in our setting), and are not 
susceptible to this issue. Hence, our results shed new light on the relation between 
corporate governance and accounting conservatism in China.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, 
and Section 3 presents our hypotheses. The empirical results are reported in Sections 4 
and 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Literature Review
Contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation are four factors proposed by Watts 
(2003a) to explain accounting conservatism. There is much evidence in support of 
the contracting and litigation hypotheses; however, there is little empirical evidence 
to support the taxation and regulation hypotheses (Watts, 2003b). Lafond and Watts 
(2008) suggest that information asymmetry among equity investors is the key reason 
for accounting conservatism; that is, conservatism is caused by the non-veriﬁcation of 
information, which results in asymmetric loss functions among related parties. When 
debt is greater, creditors require a higher level of conservatism in accounting reports to 
avoid potential losses (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003a; Nikolave, 2006). Conservative 
accounting can also be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms; hence, companies may have incentives to 
adopt conservative financial reporting policies (Francis et al., 2004; Zhang, 2008). 
Separation between ownership (cash flow rights) and control (voting rights) brings 
about agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which result from information 
asymmetry, and accounting conservatism is one of the mechanisms addressing agency 
problems that protects investor interests (LaFond and Roychowdury, 2006). The 
potential beneﬁts of conservatism in corporate governance suggest a positive relation 
between the strength of corporate governance and accounting conservatism (Beekes 
et al., 2004; LaFond and Roychowdury, 2006; Lim, 2006; Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007), which indicates that good corporate governance will lead to greater conservatism 
in accounting.
The regulation hypothesis holds that regulatory authorities may face political 
pressure and public criticism (Watts, 2003a); thus, a higher level of investor protection is 
posited to lead to a higher level of conservatism (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Cross-
country studies provide some evidence in support of this hypothesis. Regulators in 
countries with strong judicial systems are assumed to be under more pressure and more 
likely to be criticized by the public for the standards they have set, and conservatism 
can easily reduce their political costs (Watts, 2003a). Therefore, in these countries, 
accounting reports are more conservative (Ball et al., 2000; Holthausen, 2003; Huijgen 
and Lubberink, 2003; Ball et al., 2003; Lubberink and Huijgen, 2006; Bushman and 
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Piotroski, 2006). Ball et al. (2000) investigate how the diﬀerent demands for accounting 
income in diﬀerent institutional contexts cause the properties to vary across a wide range 
of countries. They find that in code law countries, accounting income is less timely, 
particularly in incorporating economic losses (Ball et al., 2000). Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) find that firms in countries with strong judicial systems reflect bad news in 
earnings faster than firms in countries with weak judicial systems. They show that a 
higher level of judicial quality and usage of public bonds, and a more diﬀuse ownership 
structure lead to more conservative accounting. Also, strong public enforcement of 
securities law (but not private enforcement) delays the recognition of good news in 
earnings relative to the case when public enforcement is weak. In brief, diﬀerences in 
institutions, judicial systems and public enforcement determine the political costs for 
regulators. Research concerning different regions obtains similar results (Holthausen, 
2003; Huijgen and Lubberink, 2003; Lubberink and Huijgen, 2006). Standard setting 
is an important determinant of conservatism; however, regulation enforcement and 
management incentives are more inﬂuential (Ball et al., 2003). Managers may also face 
pressure from the public and sometimes from the government, and some may care more 
about their political future than market compensation; thus, compliance costs to obey 
standards or other rules are diﬀerent, which aﬀects managerial incentives to comply with 
these rules. Differences in institutions, judicial systems, and public enforcement also 
inﬂuence the compliance costs of managers.
In China, nearly 80% of listed firms are controlled by the government, stock is 
highly concentrated and the level of management ownership is much lower than that 
in other countries. In addition, although there are many regulations, standards and 
laws, their enforcement is fairly weak. In other words, corporate governance in China 
is significantly different from that in the United States, United Kingdom or other 
markets. In China, management incentives and pressures diﬀer among the various types 
of ﬁrms, especially between SOEs and non-SOEs. This provides us with an opportunity 
to investigate management incentives and conservative accounting in a single emerging 
economy. Basu (2009) points out that Chinese researchers can ask more general 
questions regarding alternative institutional arrangements. As the degree of state control 
in China is probably higher than that in most other countries, nonﬁnancial and budget 
information likely plays a greater role in China than elsewhere. It would be useful to 
study how information flows between government agencies and firms, and how the 
expectations of both parties are coordinated. Chen, Gul and Wu (2008) ﬁnd that in 
China, the accounting reports of privately owned ﬁrms are more conservative than those 
of SOEs, indicating that incentives matter. They also ﬁnd an interaction eﬀect between 
incentives and accounting standards, in that ﬁrms with a greater demand for accounting 
conservatism report more conservatively in more recent periods characterized by more 
conservative accounting standards (Chen, Gul and Wu, 2008). Chen, Chen, Lobo and 
Wang (2008) examine the eﬀect of both the borrower and the lender ownership structure 
on the accounting conservatism of the borrower and ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial reporting 
of state-controlled borrowers is less conservative. However, as they use the Basu model, 
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9 We appreciate this suggestion from the referee.
they can test only conditional conservatism and thus do not investigate other corporate 
governance characteristics aﬀecting agency costs that also inﬂuence conservatism. 
3.  Theory and Hypotheses
A principal-agent relation exists among creditors, shareholders and management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and information asymmetry among them leads to 
asymmetric loss functions, which induces conservative accounting (LaFond and Watts, 
2008). In emerging markets, concentrated ownership is common, and agency problems 
are frequently observed between controlling or ultimate shareholders and minority 
shareholders and creditors.
3.1. Inﬂuence of Creditors
The greater is the uncertainty regarding future proﬁtability, the greater is the risk that 
current dividends transfer resources to shareholders, which does not serve the interests of 
creditors. Timely loss recognition can exist before contracting and also provide creditors 
with new information so that they can react to contract violations and enforce in a 
timely fashion their contractual rights, such as restricting the leverage ratio, investment 
and dividend policy (Zhang, 2008), which means that conservative accounting will 
affect the efficiency of debt contracts based on accounting numbers (the net income 
and retained earnings reported). It also means more restrictions on dividends paid out 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Ahmed et al., 2002). Because of information asymmetry 
between creditors and shareholders, creditors will require more conservative accounting 
when they expect losses (Watts, 2003a; Basu, 1997). 
However, debtors anticipate the eﬀect of their behavior on future debt contracting: 
practicing conservative accounting can decrease information asymmetry and protect the 
interests of creditors, and help debtors to establish a good reputation and lower the cost 
of current and future debt. In this situation, adopting a conservative ﬁnancial reporting 
policy can be beneficial for creditors and debtors (Zhang, 2008). As accounting 
conservatism can lower the cost of ﬁnancing for debtors, ﬁrms are motivated to report 
their numbers under conservative accounting (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008). 
Conservative accounting can provide creditors with timely information on the downside 
risk of their loans, but borrowing ﬁrms have strong incentives to delay the bad news 
if the recognition of such news leads to contract violation. This effect is likely to be 
much stronger than the reward that creditors oﬀer to borrowing ﬁrms for conservative 
accounting.9 However, ﬁnancing activities are not a one-time game, and ﬁrms may turn 
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to the securities market for more capital in the future. Once they violate the contract, 
they may be punished.10 Thus, we posit the following hypothesis:
 H1: Ceteris paribus, the greater the level of debt, the more conservative are the accounting 
reports.
3.2. Inﬂuence of Ownership
Ball et al. (2003) suggest that management incentives significantly influence the 
level of accounting conservatism. In China, management incentives and pressures diﬀer 
depending on the type of firms. To obtain external financing, both SOEs and non-
SOEs have incentives to manipulate accounting information. However, the former 
are affiliated with government and their objectives are more diverse, which makes 
them less eager to pursue opportunistic benefits through information manipulation 
compared with the latter. Non-SOEs face more ﬁnancing constraints than do SOEs, and 
conservative accounting may lead to less proﬁtable accounting earnings, which will result 
in the further restriction of external financing, both debt and equity. Therefore, the 
incentive for non-SOEs to pursue maximum proﬁts will oﬀset the incentive to practice 
conservative accounting.11
Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence between SOEs and non-SOEs is that management in 
the former must deal with greater political pressure and more constraints. It appears that 
in non-SOEs, managers are well monitored by principals, namely, entrepreneurs, and 
have incentives to improve corporate governance and maximize ﬁrm value. Corporate 
governance seems to be work better for non-SOEs than for SOEs. However, managers 
in non-SOEs face fewer political and legal restrictions than do those in SOEs, and 
they can handle many problems through unofficial channels or illegal means, which 
managers in SOEs dare not and cannot do. In non-SOEs, compliance with accounting 
principles and regulations is determined by the integrity of the management or the 
ultimate shareholders. Because punishments for accounting standard violations are 
inadequate and other regulations are not strongly enforced, the cost of violation is 
low for entrepreneurs. This problem is more severe in countries with a weak legal and 
institutional environment (Ball et al., 2003; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006), such as 
China. Therefore, the political cost for non-SOEs is much lower than that for SOEs.
The political pressure on managers in SOEs is much greater as they are constrained 
by restrictive rules and regulations.12 Compliance with these directives is the most 
10 Violations are also determined by other corporate governance mechanisms, which are also enforced through 
laws and regulations. The inﬂuence of debt is not isolated from other key determinants.
11 This does not mean they will not report conservatively, as they also face pressure from creditors, minority 
shareholders and regulatory authorities.
12 Referring to GAAP violations, these will incur critique and pressure from the public, and oﬀending ﬁrms may 
even be punished by regulatory authorities. Thus, regulation violation is bad news for management.
DONGLIN XIA AND SONG ZHU88
13 Our thanks go to the anonymous referee for pointing out that the higher level of accounting conservatism in 
SOEs compared to non-SOEs may be due to downward earnings management by the former to hide abnormal 
proﬁts due to a government monopoly. In China, ﬁrms are more likely to report higher earnings because of 
the goals or planned objectives that government has set for them. Both SOEs and non-SOEs tend to report 
higher earnings; however, those of the former are a little more conservative than those of the latter. Another 
issue is that the accounting practices of SOEs are more conservative than those of non-SOEs, perhaps because 
the former have less incentive to manage earnings to ‘fool’ the market. Thus, in the empirical tests, we need to 
control for ﬁnancing ability, scale eﬀect, earnings management incentive and other related factors to minimize 
the inﬂuence of this possibility.
important consideration for SOE management, as their violation will lead to criticism 
of management by regulatory authorities and the public, damage the reputation of 
managers and in extreme cases, ruin the political career of managers. This incentive for 
accounting conservatism related to political future is much greater among SOE managers 
than among their non-SOE counterparts. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
 H2: Ceteris paribus, accounting reports of SOEs are more conservative than those of non-
SOEs.13
In developing markets with concentrated ownership, especially those in East Asia, 
managers are usually appointed and controlled by controlling or ultimate shareholders, 
and ﬁrm behavior reﬂects the will of these shareholders. Managers play a less important 
role than do those in firms in other markets, such as the United States, because the 
control of controlling shareholders and ultimate shareholders is significant. Ultimate 
shareholders with few cash flow rights can build powerful empires via the pyramid 
structure, and this incentive is evident in countries and regions with a weak legal system 
and undeveloped economy (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). As the number 
of layers in the pyramid increases, information asymmetry becomes more severe. The 
greater is the asymmetry of information, the greater is the demand for accounting 
conservatism by investors (Lafond and Watts, 2008). Various principal-agent problems 
are aggravated as the pyramid grows and the separation between control and cash ﬂow 
rights increases, which also increases the demand for accounting conservatism. However, 
as the pyramid grows and information asymmetry becomes more severe, agency costs 
increase, and management or ultimate shareholders may exaggerate earnings and tunnel 
via aggressive reporting policies. In this situation, the accounting reports become less 
conservative as the number of layers in the pyramid increases. 
As the supply and demand sides will have diﬀerent ﬁnancial reporting policies, the 
net result will be determined by the equilibrium. 
 H3a: Ceteris paribus, the number of layers in the corporate pyramid significantly 
inﬂuences the accounting reporting policy.
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14 It is diﬃcult to tell which beneﬁt (higher rank or more money) the manager will favor. A higher rank can 
bring more money, and more of other things. More layers in the pyramid will lead to a more distant relation 
with government; thus, the possibility to be promoted or appointed to government is less likely, which is less 
attractive among management in SOEs.
15 Although minority shareholders may demand more conservative accounting as they anticipate potential losses 
due to tunneling activities by controlling shareholders, because they have less voting power to put pressure on 
controlling shareholders or management, the eﬀect of their demand may be insigniﬁcant.
16 Concentrated ownership can give more power to controlling shareholders but also aligns their interests with 
those of minority shareholders. Therefore, after a certain level, controlling shareholders may not tunnel, which 
means that control rights may be nonlinearly related with the ﬁnancial reporting policy. We check for the 
nonlinear relation in the robustness testing. We ﬁnd that this alignment eﬀect is actually controlled by the 
divergence between control and cash ﬂow rights (CV).
Among SOEs, the pyramid has somewhat different effects, as the incentive to 
create a pyramidal structure is to decentralize power, decrease the level of government 
interference and allow greater flexibility in the operation of listed firms in the free 
market economy (Fan et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006). Management can then play a greater 
role in ﬁrm operation, as there is less interference and pressure from the government. A 
political career may not be as easy to obtain, but it may not be as important as market-
based compensation.14 Management may prefer higher earnings. Therefore, among 
SOEs, political pressure related to laws/regulations will decrease as the number of tiers 
in the pyramid increases. Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose the following 
hypothesis:
 H3b: Ceteris paribus, among SOEs, the greater the number of layers in the corporate 
pyramid, the lower the demand for more conservative accounting reports, resulting in a 
lower level of accounting conservatism.
In countries with diffuse ownership, such as the United States, management is 
monitored by shareholders through laws/regulations and accounting information, 
leading to a demand for accounting conservatism. In countries with unsound monitoring 
mechanisms and institutions, controlling shareholders monitor management and can 
exploit investors (La Porta et al., 1999). As their control rights increase, dominant 
controlling shareholders rely less on accounting information, which lowers the demand 
for accounting conservatism. That is, more voting rights for ultimate shareholders results 
in a lower demand for conservative accounting. 
As control rights increase, controlling shareholders can more easily tunnel the wealth 
of minority shareholders and use accounting information to manipulate earnings, which 
also decreases the level of the quality and conservatism of accounting information.15
 H4a: Ceteris paribus, the greater are the voting rights of ultimate shareholders, the less 
conservative are the accounting reports.16
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In countries with weak investor protection, the wealth of minority shareholders is 
often expropriated by controlling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 
2002), as the former have only a few cash ﬂow rights and lack voting rights to challenge 
the entrenchment of the latter. The greater is the separation of voting rights from cash 
ﬂow rights among controlling shareholders, the greater is their incentive to tunnel (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1999), which stimulates the demand of minority 
shareholders for conservative accounting information to protect their interests. In some 
firms, ultimate shareholders do not directly control the firm; therefore, there is also 
information asymmetry between the ultimate shareholders and management. Also, the 
greater is the separation of control rights from cash ﬂow rights, the greater is the risk that 
stockholders face, and thus they too will demand conservative accounting. 
Such separation also triggers agency problems, and ultimate shareholders may be 
more likely to tunnel when divergence is great. Thus, greater divergence will lead to a 
lower level of accounting conservatism. Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 H4b: Ceteris paribus, the separation of voting rights from cash ﬂow rights signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuences the level of accounting conservatism.
3.3. Inﬂuence of Management
Management has an information advantage compared to others; hence, managers 
have the opportunity to manipulate accounting information to maximize their interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). For example, they may 
exaggerate ﬁrm performance to obtain greater compensation. They also have an incentive 
to adopt aggressive accounting to boost the stock price as this will increase their wealth. 
Watts (2003a) proposes that accounting conservatism can reduce the incentive and 
ability of management to overvalue earnings and equity, as conservative accounting 
delays revenue recognition and reduces the ability of management to hide expected 
losses. Therefore, accounting conservatism can prevent overpayment to management 
that results from limited liability and limited tenure. 
The compensation and political future of managers are based on ﬁrm performance. 
Good performance will bring greater rewards and encouragement, so management in 
both SOEs and non-SOEs have incentives to improve firm performance. However, 
conservative accounting recognizes bad news in a more timely fashion than it does 
good news, and revenue recognition is asymmetric, which leads to a negative eﬀect on 
ﬁrm performance. Therefore, management will select a ﬁnancial reporting method to 
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maximize their own interests, and tend to be aggressive in reporting earnings, which will 
decrease the level of accounting conservatism.17 
 H5: Ceteris paribus, the greater the stockholding by management, the less conservative the 
accounting reports.
Conservative accounting reports help to decrease information asymmetry between 
management and other stakeholders, and reduce the agency costs due to asymmetric loss 
functions and limited tenure of management (Watts, 2003a). A dominant board with 
more independent, or outside, directors will be more eﬃcient in eﬀective contracting, 
and better understand the beneﬁts of conservative accounting reports; therefore, they 
will require more conservative financial reporting (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and 
Duellman, 2007). However, a board dominated by inside directors, that is, those who 
are also management, will face less monitoring, and in this situation, management may 
adopt an aggressive accounting policy. The separation of the roles of CEO and chairman 
of the board will enhance board independence, which will improve the monitoring of 
management. In addition, as insiders tend to expropriate outside minority shareholders, 
such separation increases the level of shareholder protection. Hence, we propose the 
following hypothesis:
 H6: Ceteris paribus, the more independent the board, the more conservative the 
accounting reports.
4. Data and Variables
4.1. Data and Samples
To avoid the influence of fundamental differences due to listed firms launching 
IPOs or delisting at diﬀerent times, we use the same ﬁrms listed from 1999 to 2006, 
with 855 ﬁrms for each year. Before 1998, ﬁrms in China did not need to publish cash 
ﬂow statements; hence, we start from 1999 for the ease of obtaining cash ﬂow data.18 
Since 2007, all listed firms in China have had to comply with the new accounting 
standards, which are quite diﬀerent from the old ones; therefore, to keep the ﬁnancial 
data consistent, we use those before 2007. The samples used to measure conservatism 
are from 2001 to 2006 as we need three years of ﬁnancial information to compute the 
17 Although the listed ﬁrms are actually controlled by controlling shareholders, management still has some power 
and influence regarding important decisions, such as the selection of the financial reporting policy. Both 
standards and contracts give them some leeway to exercise professional discretion.
18 Chinese listed ﬁrms have had to publish cash ﬂow statements since 1998; however, the cash ﬂow information 
for some ﬁrms is missing from the database or is incomplete. Therefore, we use the data since 1999.
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19 We also add all of those ﬁrms and the results are basically the same. Here, to minimize the inﬂuence of outliers, 
we drop some.
20 In China, when listed ﬁrms suﬀer losses for three consecutive years, the stock names will be labeled as ST, ‘Special 
Treatment’, which means if they still cannot make proﬁt for two additional years after they are ST, they will be 
required to delist.
21 We delete all those ﬁrms that are ‘ST’ and the previous ones to minimize the inﬂuence of earnings management 
for ST ﬁrms on the measurement of conservatism.
22 This measure of conservatism also has drawbacks, as it is easily influenced by earnings management. In 
particular, for those firms suffering losses, the conservatism measure based on accruals is significantly 
inﬂuenced. Therefore, we drop all those ST ﬁrms and also use a dummy variable, ‘Loss,’ which equals 1 if a 
ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in the current year, and 0 otherwise.
conservatism measures (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Qiang, 2007). After dropping 
ﬁrms with incomplete ultimate shareholder information, those whose growth exceeds 
500%, those with leverage exceeding 100%19 and those that are ST ﬁrms, 20, 21 the ﬁnal 
sample includes 4,149 ﬁrm-year observations for the 2001-2006 period. To minimize 
the influence of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the conservatism 
measures.
Information about ultimate shareholders is extracted manually from annual ﬁnancial 
reports. Other ﬁnancial data are from the Wind and CSMAR databases.
4.2. Variables
Most research in accounting conservatism uses the Basu (1997) model. However, 
this model suﬀers from measurement errors and has recently been criticized for being 
econometrically unstable; hence, whether it can measure conservatism is a subject of 
debate in the ﬁeld (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Dietrich et al., 2006; Gregoriou and 
Skerratt, 2007). In addition, this model measures only conditional conservatism, but 
no unconditional conservatism. Conservative accounting leads to negative accruals, and 
the more negative are accruals, the more conservative are ﬁnancial reports (Givoly and 
Hayn, 2000). We use the accrual-based measure of conservatism proposed by Givoly and 
Hayn (2000), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Qiang (2007).22 Because accounting 
accruals are reversed in the next period, we use three years’ cumulative accruals as our 
conservatism measure (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). For ease of explanation, we 
multiply cumulative accruals by -1; thus, the greater is the value of this measure, the 
greater is accounting conservatism. Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied 
by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary items plus depreciation 
minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end. Con12 is 
three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings 
after extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total 
assets at year end excluding the inﬂuence of depreciation. Firms often use extraordinary 
items to manipulate earnings; therefore, we also control for this, measuring conservatism 
using earnings before extraordinary items. Con21 is three years’ cumulative accruals 
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multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at 
year end; Con22 is also three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, but each year’s 
accruals equal net income before extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, 
and then divided by total assets at year end.23 
The inﬂuence of creditors is proxied by the debt ratio (Lev), which is equal to total 
liability divided by total assets at year end.24 Ownership structure variables include: 
the control chain or pyramid layers (Chain), measured by the corporate layers from 
ultimate shareholders to the listed ﬁrms, following Fan et al. (2005) and Zhu (2006); 
the control rights of the ultimate shareholders, proxied by the voting rights of ultimate 
shareholders considering the indirect holdings (V); the separation of ownership rights 
and control rights, proxied by the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights 
(CV), following La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000)25; and the nature 
of the ultimate shareholders (State), indicated by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
ultimate shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise. Management ownership (Man) 
is the percentage of shares held by ﬁrm management of total shares at year end. Board 
independence is proxied by: (1) the ratio of outside directors to total directors on the 
board (Out), (2) the ratio of directors who are also management to total directors on the 
board (Inside)26 and (3) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as both 
CEO and chairman of the board (CC), and 0 otherwise. 
Fundamental aspects of listed ﬁrms include: cash ﬂow from operations to total assets 
at year end (CFO); firm size, proxied by the natural log form of total assets at year 
end (Size); future prospects, proxied by the growth rate of revenue (Growth); earnings 
management inclination, proxied by a dummy variable (Loss) that is equal to 1 if a 
ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in the current year, and 0 otherwise; and industry (Inds, 11 dummy 
variables for 12 industries excluding the ﬁnance industry, based on the categorization 
scheme of the China Securities Regulatory Commission) and year (Years, ﬁve dummy 
variables for six years) eﬀects.
23 As some extraordinary items are outcomes of earnings management whereas other are not, it is diﬃcult to say 
which measure is a better proxy of conservatism. In the literature, some use earnings plus depreciation whereas 
others use net earnings. To minimize measurement error, we use four measures to proxy for conservatism in the 
robustness test, and the results show that the four alternative proxies are basically consistent. 
24 Although operating liability, such as payments to suppliers or employees, is similar to debt from banks, the 
former may not play a role in the requirement for conservative reporting; thus, we use debt from banks and 
other institutions as the leverage in the robustness test.
25 CV equals cash ﬂow rights (C) divided by control rights (V). A lower CV value means greater separation 
between cash ﬂow and control rights.
26 In China, some directors are outside or independent directors from universities or unrelated ﬁrms, others 
are members of management in the ﬁrms, such as the CEO, CFO or CIO and still others are appointed by 
shareholders to monitor management. Therefore, the sum of Out and Inside is not necessarily one and is 
seldom one.
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27 None of these numbers is winsorized.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the statistics for the conservatism measures based on the cumulative 
accruals in each ﬁrm year.27 
Table 1.  Evolution of Accounting Conservatism in Chinese Listed Firms – Statistics
Variables Year N Mean SD Max Median Min
Con11 2006 855 0.0789 0.2405 1.8146 0.0536 -0.7933
2005 855 0.0632 0.2408 1.4457 0.0401 -1.4461
2004 855 0.0468 0.2405 1.7303 0.0289 -1.3854
2003 855 0.0288 0.2539 1.8933 0.0176 -2.1019
2002 855 0.0050 0.2465 2.1174 0.0110 -2.2488
2001 855 -0.0553 0.2195 0.9595 -0.0409 -1.6258
Con12 2006 855 0.1619 0.2470 1.8802 0.1418 -0.7897
2005 855 0.1451 0.2493 1.4727 0.1356 -1.4298
2004 855 0.1267 0.2494 1.7949 0.1192 -1.3698
2003 855 0.1053 0.2603 1.9512 0.1002 -2.1000
2002 855 0.0779 0.2507 2.1439 0.0827 -2.2435
2001 855 0.0167 0.2264 1.4934 0.0282 -1.5784
Con21 2006 855 0.0910 0.2251 1.7730 0.0667 -0.7911
2005 855 0.0706 0.2274 1.4518 0.0494 -1.3540
2004 855 0.0506 0.2196 1.7024 0.0357 -1.3011
2003 855 0.0326 0.2339 1.4988 0.0257 -2.0027
2002 855 0.0094 0.2233 1.4181 0.0210 -2.1549
2001 855 -0.0375 0.2111 1.0217 -0.0253 -1.6074
Con22 2006 855 0.1740 0.2321 1.8386 0.1550 -0.7875
2005 855 0.1526 0.2365 1.4788 0.1432 -1.3377
2004 855 0.1305 0.2288 1.7536 0.1232 -1.2854
2003 855 0.1090 0.2407 1.5477 0.1029 -2.0007
2002 855 0.0824 0.2279 1.4607 0.0934 -2.1496
2001 855 0.0346 0.2178 1.5556 0.0478 -1.5600
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM IN CHINA 95
Note: Con12 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after 
extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con22 is also 
three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, but each year’s accrual equals net income before extraordinary 
items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end.
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
con11-mean con11-median con21-mean con21-median
Figure 1.  Evolution of Accounting Conservatism in Chinese Listed Firms Based on Earnings 
before Depreciation
Note: Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year 
end; Con21 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year 
end.
Figure 2.  Evolution of Accounting Conservatism in Chinese Listed Firms Based on Earnings after 
Depreciation
Note:  Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at 
year end; Con12 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after 
extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con21 is three 
years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con22 is also three 
years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, but each year’s accrual equals net income before extraordinary items 
minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end.
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The statistics in Table 1 and graphs in Figures 1 and 2 show that since 2001, the 
level of accounting conservatism of listed firms in China has increased each year, 
consistent with the ﬁnding of Qu and Qiu (2007) that with the implementation of more 
conservative accounting standards and the enforcement of regulations, ﬁrms in China 
have become more conservative in their ﬁnancial reporting.
Table 2 presents the statistics for the regression variables of the sample ﬁrms.28 The 
values of the conservatism measures based on earnings before extraordinary items are 
0.0110 and 0.0227 on average, and those of the other two measures are 0.0911 and 
0.1027. Positive numbers indicate a conservative ﬁnancial reporting policy, but some 
ﬁrms still have aggressive ﬁnancial reporting practices.
The average debt ratio of the sample ﬁrms is around 47%, and the median is about 
48%. Among our sample ﬁrms, about 78% are SOEs, which means that in the Chinese 
securities market, only about 20% of ﬁrms are not controlled by the government. The 
average number of layers in the corporate pyramid is 2.36, which means that ultimate 
shareholders usually control ﬁrms via at least one intermediate ﬁrm, with some even 
setting up four ﬁrms in the pyramid to control listed ﬁrms. Control, or voting, rights 
of ultimate shareholders (V) is 42% on average. The degree of separation of cash ﬂow 
rights from voting rights is not great; the average CV is 0.86 and the median is 1, which 
means that among most listed ﬁrms in China, voting rights do not deviate much from 
cash ﬂow rights and ultimate shareholders do not control ﬁrms with very low cash ﬂow. 
Management ownership in listed ﬁrms is very low, only about 0.03%, which means that 
management in China is not provided with enough stock incentives. Outside directors 
make up less than one third of total directors on boards, which is close to the minimum 
standard (one third) required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
and indicates that listed ﬁrms do not have many incentives to appoint outside directors, 
with most simply complying with the requirement. This situation may lead to the 
ineﬀectiveness of outside directors. Directors who are also management comprise about 
20% of all directors, which means that 2 out of 5 directors also participate in the daily 
operation of ﬁrms; therefore, they can convey more information to other directors about 
firm operations, which increases the efficiency of information communication and 
decision-making processes. However, this may also lead to the insider control problem. 
In 10% of the sample ﬁrms, the CEO is also the chairman, which may lead to self-
monitoring problems.
Cash ﬂow from operations to total assets is 0.059 on average, and ﬁrms show high 
growth, with a 19.77% growth in revenue. However, about 15.74% of the sample ﬁrms 
suﬀer losses during the sample period.
28 The conservatism measures are winsorized.
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics
Variables N Mean SD Min Median Max
Con11 4,149 0.0110 0.1814 -0.5893 0.0150 0.6276
Con12 4,149 0.0911 0.1925 -0.5454 0.0979 0.7351
Con21 4,149 0.0227 0.1749 -0.5580 0.0259 0.6224
Con22 4,149 0.1027 0.1854 -0.5123 0.1061 0.7301
Lev 4,149 0.4758 0.1779 0.0081 0.4835 0.9964
State 4,149 0.7874 0.4092 0 1 1
Chain 4,149 2.3656 0.7336 1 2 5
V 4,149 0.4279 0.1643 0.0500 0.4169 0.8858
CV 4,149 0.8616 0.2397 0.0171 1 1
Man 4,149 0.0310 0.1266 0 0.0101 5.1177
Out 4,149 0.2759 0.1238 0 0.3333 0.6000
Inside 4,149 0.2036 0.1277 0 0.1818 1
CC 4,149 0.0957 0.2942 0 0 1
CFO 4,149 0.0590 0.1077 -1.3800 0.05639 1.0293
Size 4,149 21.1804 0.9027 17.5367 21.1147 24.9905
Growth 4,149 0.1977 0.5015 -1.0000 0.1307 4.8780
Loss 4,149 0.1574 0.3642 0 0 1
Note:  Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con12 is three 
years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary items minus cash 
ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con21 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied 
by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from 
operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con22 is also three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, 
but each year’s accrual equals net income before extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided 
by total assets at year end; Lev is the total debt ratio, which is equal to total liability divided by total assets at year end; 
State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise; Chain is the length 
of the control chain from the ultimate shareholder to the listed ﬁrm; V is the voting rights of the ultimate shareholder; 
CV is cash ﬂow rights divided by voting rights; Man is management ownership; Out is the ratio of outside (independent) 
directors to total directors on the board; Inside is the ratio of directors who are also management to total directors on the 
board; CC is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; CFO 
is the cash ﬂow from operations to total assets at year end; Size is the natural log form of total assets at year end; Growth 
is the growth rate of revenue; and Loss is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in that year, and 0 
otherwise.
Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients for the variables. They are 0.4658 for CV 
and Chain and 0.4186 for CV and State, which is natural in a pyramidal structure, as a 
greater number of layers often lead to greater separation of control from cash ﬂow rights. 
Among ﬁrms controlled by the government, the degree of divergence is much less. The 
coeﬃcients indicate that collinearity is not a signiﬁcant problem.29
29 In the regression model, we test the VIF, variance inﬂation factor, to check for the collinearity. 
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Expsign Con11 Con12 Con21 Con22
Lev H1 + 0.1078
(6.20)***
0.1037
(7.37)***
0.0937
(8.57)***
0.0884
(10.41)***
State H2 + 0.0519
(4.51)***
0.0548
(4.65)***
0.0509
(4.10) ***
0.0534
(4.02)***
Chain H3a + 0.0137
(3.13)***
0.0131
(3.18)***
0.0141
(2.56)**
0.0134
(2.48)**
StateChain H3b - -0.0174
(-3.26)***
-0.0180
(-3.15)***
-0.0164
(-2.85)***
-0.0170
(-2.71)***
V H4a - -0.0612
(-5.50)***
-0.0394
(-2.96)***
-0.0490
(-3.82)***
-0.0277
(-2.87)***
CV H4b + 0.0152(0.75)
0.0114
(0.51)
0.0194
(0.98)
0.0155
(0.69)
Man H5 - -0.0335
(-2.08)*
-0.0378
(-2.10)*
-0.0309
(-2.28)*
-0.0354
(-2.28)*
Out H6 ? -0.0489
(-2.57)**
-0.0506
(-2.40)*
-0.0571
(-2.78)***
-0.0581
(-3.24)***
Inside H6 ? -0.0194(-1.78)
-0.0197
(-1.14)
-0.0308
(-2.31)*
-0.0314
(-1.65)
CC H6 ? 0.0002(0.02)
0.0019
(0.21)
0.0036
(0.41)
0.0053
(0.64)
CFO ? 0.8833(28.23)***
0.9832
(25.56)***
0.8549
(31.14)***
0.9535
(26.99)***
Size ? -0.0137(-4.96)***
-0.0067
(-2.37)*
-0.0186
(-6.44)***
-0.0116
(-4.08)***
Growth - -0.0201(-4.33)***
-0.0197
(-3.55)***
-0.0184
(-3.31)***
-0.0178
(-2.70)**
Loss ? 0.1228(18.20)***
0.1183
(18.64)***
0.0956
(16.91)***
0.0911
(18.76)***
Inds Control Control Control Control
Years Control Control Control Control
N 4149 4149 4149 4149
R2 0.3522 0.3979 0.3374 0.3853
5.2. Regression Analysis
Table 4 shows the regression results for the determinants of conservatism based on 
the cumulative accruals using the data of Chinese listed ﬁrms. We perform the regression 
using the four measurements of conservatism. As conservatism is very stable across 
years (see Table 1), we cluster the standard errors by year (Peterson, 2008) and add year 
dummies to control for year eﬀects. 
Table 4.  Information Asymmetry, Agency Problems and Accounting Conservatism
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Because creditors are at an information disadvantage, to protect their interests they 
will demand conservative ﬁnancial reporting. The greater is their interest in the ﬁrm, 
the greater is the loss that they may suﬀer in the future and thus the greater will be the 
pressure that they will exert on management for conservative accounting. Because more 
conservative accounting can decrease the level of unnecessary losses and ﬁnancing costs, 
it is also beneﬁcial for management and controlling shareholders; thus, they will have 
incentives to adopt conservative accounting practices. The results in Table 4 show that 
after controlling for the inﬂuence of ownership structure, management/board and other 
fundamentals, Lev is positively related with accounting conservatism and significant 
at the 0.01 level for all four regressions, which means that greater debt imposes more 
pressure on management to adopt a conservative ﬁnancial reporting policy, which leads 
to greater accounting conservatism. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
The significantly positive coefficients for State reveal that the level of accounting 
conservatism among SOEs is higher than that among non-SOEs; hence, Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. Although in SOEs it may appear that no principal is in charge, the pressures 
and constraints that the management of these ﬁrms deal with are much greater than 
those with which the management of non-SOEs must contend. SOE managers face 
greater political pressure, and hence their political costs are higher than those of their 
non-SOE counterparts. Non-SOE management or individual ultimate shareholders 
also face fewer government-related constraints. Therefore, the incentive to comply with 
accounting principles is greater among SOEs than among non-SOEs.
As the number of layers in the corporate pyramid increases, so does the level 
of information asymmetry, and investors will demand a higher level of accounting 
conservatism. Although information asymmetry may lead to greater agency costs, 
Note: Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con12 is three 
years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary items minus cash 
ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con21 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied 
by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from 
operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con22 is also three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, 
but each year’s accrual equals net income before extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided 
by total assets at year end; Lev is the total debt ratio, which is equal to total liability divided by total assets at year end; 
State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise; Chain is the length 
of the control chain from the ultimate shareholder to the listed ﬁrm; V is the voting rights of the ultimate shareholder; 
CV is cash ﬂow rights divided by voting rights; Man is management ownership; Out is the ratio of outside (independent) 
directors to total directors on the board; Inside is the ratio of directors who are also management to total directors on the 
board; CC is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; CFO 
is the cash ﬂow from operations to total assets at year end; Size is the natural log form of total assets at year end; Growth 
is the growth rate of revenue; and Loss is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in that year, and 0 
otherwise. In the parentheses are the clustered standard error statistics. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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30 This means the independent directors cannot voice for the minority shareholders; what they do is to agree with 
whatever the management or larger shareholders want.
motivating management or ultimate shareholders to exaggerate earnings and tunnel 
via aggressive reporting policies, the ﬁnal result will be determined by the equilibrium 
between the supply and the demand sides, which will have diﬀerent ﬁnancial reporting 
policies. We ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of the pyramidal structure on conservatism is positive 
in general, especially among non-SOEs, indicated by the positive relation between Chain 
and the conservatism measures; hence, Hypothesis 3a is supported. This result also shows 
that the eﬀect of the demand side is greater than that of the supply side. Among SOEs 
with a longer chain of control, the level of government interference is lower; therefore, 
the pressure to comply with accounting principles is reduced, as shown in the negative 
coeﬃcient for StateChain, which is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Hence, Hypothesis 3b is 
supported.
As the level of control/voting rights increases, controlling shareholders rely less 
on accounting information, which leads to a decrease in the level of accounting 
conservatism. Such an increase in voting rights can lead to the expropriation of the 
wealth of small investors by ultimate shareholders and worsen agency problems (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986); accounting information is more 
likely to be manipulated and there is less incentive for conservative reporting. The 
regression results show significant negative coefficients for V in all regressions; thus, 
hypothesis 4a is supported. However, the coeﬃcient for the separation of voting rights 
from cash flow rights is positive but not significant, and thus hypothesis 4b is not 
supported. One possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that the degree of such separation 
is not great in China, and the tunneling incentive on average may not be signiﬁcant. 
Another possible reason may be that the demand is not greater than the supply.
Management will manipulate earnings by choosing a reporting method that will 
maximize their own interests. This will lead to less conservative annual reports, especially 
when the level of management ownership is higher and compensation is more closely 
linked with ﬁrm performance. This is shown by the negative relation between Man and 
the conservatism proxy, which is significant at the 0.10 level. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is 
supported.
The motive in China for introducing the mechanism of outside directors is to 
ensure greater corporate board independence and protection of investor interests. 
A higher outside director ratio indicates a higher level of board independence, and 
thus better protection of the interests of creditors and small investors. However, in 
China, outside directors do not play this role, as authorities and small investors might 
expect. A conservative accounting policy is found to be negatively related to the ratio 
of outside directors, which is inconsistent with our expectations and the ﬁndings for 
the United States market (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). One possible explanation 
for this finding is that independent directors in China are often ‘vases’30 and do not 
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31 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the regression results, which are consistent with the results in Table 4.
32 The results for the other three conservatism measures are basically the same but are not reported here for the 
sake of brevity.
work as efficiently as expected. Accounting reporting policies are controlled by large 
shareholders or management: what outsider directors are required to do is to vote on and 
conﬁrm that reporting. A higher percentage of outside directors may give management 
or large shareholders more power on the board and greater opportunity to manipulate 
accounting information. Management on boards, deﬁned as inside directors, may adopt 
aggressive accounting policies to maximize their own interests in theory; however, the 
coeﬃcient for Inside is only signiﬁcant in the regression for Con21. Separation of the 
CEO and chairman roles does not significantly influence accounting conservatism, 
either. Regression analysis shows that the influence of the board on accounting 
conservatism in China is not as great as that of ownership structure or debt; therefore, 
hypothesis 6 is not supported.
We should note that loss firms may tend to engage in earnings management by 
taking a “big bath” in the latter year, which could inﬂuence the conservatism measure. 
Therefore, we use a dummy variable (Loss) to control for this eﬀect. Even though the 
coeﬃcient for Loss is signiﬁcantly positive, meaning that the measure of conservatism 
may be aﬀected by the earnings management incentive and loss ﬁrms indeed will create 
more accruals, the coeﬃcients for our variables of interest are still consistent with the 
hypothesis, meaning that earnings management does not change our results.
To investigate which determinant has the greatest eﬀect on conservatism, we also 
run separate regressions for debt, ownership structure and board31; the R2 for each one 
is 0.3473, 0.3121 and 0.3084, respectively, revealing that debt is the most important 
factor, followed by ownership, and that board has little inﬂuence.
5.3. Robustness Testing
Table 5 shows the results of robustness tests using the first conservatism measure 
(Con11).32
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Column 1 shows the regression results for the SOE sample, and column 2 those of 
the non-SOE sample, to further compare the diﬀerences between the two types of ﬁrms. 
The coeﬃcient for Chain is not signiﬁcant among SOEs, as the eﬀect of the pyramidal 
structure on conservatism among SOEs is determined by the eﬀect of reduced political 
cost and that of greater information asymmetry. Among non-SOEs, it is signiﬁcantly 
positive, meaning that information asymmetry will require more conservative reporting. 
Regarding the control rights of ultimate shareholders, the greater is their control, the 
lower is the level of the conservatism of their ﬁnancial reporting, indicating less demand 
for accounting conservatism. The separation of control rights from cash ﬂow rights still 
does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the ﬁnancial reporting policies of either SOEs or non-
SOEs. The coeﬃcient for management ownership (Man) is not signiﬁcant among non-
SOEs but still negatively signiﬁcant among SOEs. This may be related to the inﬂuence 
of ultimate shareholders as individuals in non-SOEs, where management have greater 
authority and power, unlike the case in SOEs. For board independence, a greater 
number of outside directors in non-SOEs have a negative influence on conservative 
reporting, but the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in SOEs. Also, among non-SOEs, the ratio of 
inside directors decreases the level of conservatism of ﬁnancial reporting. This may be 
due to the reduced monitoring eﬀect of the board, which is dominated by management 
(insiders); in such cases, management tend to adopt aggressive accounting reporting 
policies. Whether or not the CEO is also the chairman still does affect the financial 
reporting policy of either SOEs or non-SOEs. The results are basically consistent with 
those that we present in Table 4, and generally support our hypotheses. 
The inﬂuence of the control rights of ultimate shareholders on the ﬁnancial reporting 
policy may not be as linear as the inﬂuence of management ownership on ﬁrm value or 
performance. To test for the nonlinear relation, we use the square of control rights as a 
Note: Con11 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con12 is three 
years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings after extraordinary items minus cash 
ﬂow from operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con21 is three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied 
by -1, accruals for each year equal to earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and minus cash ﬂow from 
operations, and then divided by total assets at year end; Con22 is also three years’ cumulative accruals multiplied by -1, 
but each year’s accrual equals net income before extraordinary items minus cash ﬂow from operations, and then divided 
by total assets at year end; Lev is the total debt ratio, which is equal to total liability divided by total assets at year end; 
State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise; Chain is the length 
of the control chain from the ultimate shareholder to the listed ﬁrm; V is the voting rights of the ultimate shareholder; 
CV is cash ﬂow rights divided by voting rights; Man is management ownership; Out is the ratio of outside (independent) 
directors to total directors on the board; Inside is the ratio of directors who are also management to total directors on the 
board; CC is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise; CFO 
is the cash ﬂow from operations to total assets at year end; Size is the natural log form of total assets at year end; Growth 
is the growth rate of revenue; and Loss is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm suﬀers a loss in that year, and 0 
otherwise. In the ﬁrst four columns, in the parentheses are the clustered standard error statistics. In the ﬁfth column, in 
the parentheses are the Newey-West modiﬁed for Fama-Macbeth standard error adjusted statistics, and in the last column, 
in the parentheses are the two-way clustered robust standard error statistics. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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robustness test.33 The results, which are shown in column 3, reveal that the coeﬃcient 
for V-sq (the square form of control rights) is insigniﬁcant, meaning that a nonlinear 
relation is not supported. The coeﬃcient for V is still negative and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 
level. The results for the other variables are consistent with those presented in Table 4.
Although operating liability, such as payments to suppliers or employees, is similar 
to debt from banks, the former may not play a role in the requirement for conservative 
reporting.34 Thus, we use debt from institutions to substitute for total debt as a 
robustness test for the inﬂuence of debt. Debt from institutions is measured by short-
term debt from banks plus long-term debt from banks plus the bond payable scaled 
by total assets at year end. The results, which are presented in column 4, show that 
the coefficient for the new leverage variable indicates again a positive relation with 
conservatism and is significant at the 0.01 level, consistent with the results for total 
debt. Concerning the explanatory power of total debt (R2 = 0.3522) and debt from 
institutions (R2 = 0.3338), we can say that other creditors may also have some inﬂuence 
on the level of conservatism of accounting reporting.
Accounting studies increasingly rely on panel data, which are cross-sectionally and 
serially dependent; however, the econometric literature shows that two-way cluster robust 
standard errors (CL-2) are robust to both cross-sectional and time-series correlation 
(Petersen, 2008). To demonstrate the appropriateness of our model, we show in Table 5 
the results using other regression methods: the Newey-West modiﬁed for Fama-Macbeth 
and CL-2. The results do not change.
6. Conclusion
A principal-agent relation exists among creditors, shareholders and management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and information asymmetry among them leads to 
asymmetric loss functions, which induces conservative accounting (LaFond and 
Watts, 2008). This paper investigates the determinants of accounting conservatism 
using accrual-based measures and data from 2001 to 2006 in China. We ﬁnd that a 
high degree of leverage, low level of control of ultimate shareholders, and low level 
of management ownership lead to conservative reporting. We provide evidence in 
support of the argument put forward by Ball et al. (2003), namely, that management 
incentives to comply with standards signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the level of the conservatism 
of accounting reporting and information quality. Non-SOEs and SOEs in China 
have diﬀerent political concerns and are subjected to diﬀerent pressures, which leads 
to different levels of conservatism in their financial reporting. A reduction in those 
33 We also check for other nonlinear relations, such as three squares or four squares, and the results are basically 
the same, which means that the nonlinear relation is not supported.
34 Creditors also demand conservative ﬁnancial reporting; however, demand by creditors may not be as great as 
that by banks or other ﬁnancial institutions.
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concerns and pressures leads to a corresponding decrease in accounting conservatism. 
Our ﬁndings reveal that board independence has no eﬀect on the level of accounting 
conservatism.
A number of issues remain unresolved. The ﬁrst is the endogeneity problem, which 
is always a concern in corporate governance and often ignored in the conservative 
accounting research. In this paper we do not solve this problem. Because the 
determinants of conservatism in our paper cover four aspects, it is very diﬃcult to deal 
with the problem of endogeneity. The second issue is that our data comes from before 
2007, in which year the CSRC initiated new accounting principles based on the concept 
of fair market value. How this concept influences conservative accounting compared 
with traditional cost accounting is not addressed in this paper.
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